Eclectic Anecdotes

The Jesuit Francis Sullivan was an authority on the Catholic magisterium. In his book, Creative Fidelity: Weighing and Interpreting Documents of the Magisterium, he addresses the issue of the decree Haec sancta, which some have claimed to support conciliarism. Below is the relevant text in his book.

Council of Constance (1414-1418)

We come now to the most controversial of councils, and the most controversial of decrees of councils, in the history of the church. This council has the merit of having brought an end to the disastrous schism which had divided the western church for almost forty years. The cardinals who had elected Urban VI in 1378 soon afterward denounced his election as invalid, claiming they had acted under duress. They then elected another pope, Clement VII, who took up residence at Avignon, while Urban stayed on in Rome. For the next thirty years, the church was divided between adherents to the two rival popes and their successors. In 1408 the cardinals of both sides summoned a council which took place at Pisa, and attempted to end the schism by disposing both rival popes, and electing a new one, who the name Alexander V. However, the popes of Rome and Avignon refused to step down, so the successor of Alexander V, John XXIII, was persuaded by Emperor Sigismund to summon a new council, which began in Constance in 1414. When John XXIII saw himself in danger of being deposed by this council for his notorious crimes, he fled, hoping thereby to bring the council to an end. However, Emperor Sigismund persuaded the bishops to carry on and resolve the schism. They saw that this could be done only by invoking the thesis commonly held by medieval canonists, that a general council can judge a heretical or schismatic pope, and declare him deposed. Prior to taking action against the three rival popes, all of whom they considered guilty of prolonging the schism by their refusal to resign, the council decided first to declare its own competence to take such action. For this purpose, on April 6, 1415, it enacted the decree Haec sancta, whose text reads as follows.

This holy synod of Constance, which is a general council, for the eradication of the present and for bringing unity and reform to God’s church in head and members, legitimately assembled in the Holy Spirit to the praise of almighty God, ordains, defines, decrees, discerns and declares as follows, in order that this union and reform of God’s church may be obtained the more easily, securely, fruitfully and freely.

First it declares that, legitimately assembled in the holy Spirit, constituting a general council and representing the Catholic Church militant, it has power immediately from Christ; and that everyone of whatever state of dignity, even papal, is bound to obey it in those matters which pertain to the faith, the eradication of the said schism and the general reform of the said church of God in head and members.

Next, it declares that anyone of whatsoever condition, state or dignity, even papal, who contumaciously refuses to obey the past or future mandates, statutes, ordinances or precepts of this sacred council or of any other legitimately assembled general council, regarding the aforesaid things or matters pertaining to them, shall be subjected to well-deserved penance, unless he repents, and shall be duly punished, even by having recourse, if necessary, to other supports of the law.

This decree raises a great many questions, to practically all of which conflicting answers have been given. To discuss all these questions would require a long book. Here we shall ask only one question: What doctrinal weight does this decree have?

Joseph Gill judges this decree to be simply invalid, on the grounds that at the time it was enacted Constance was not yet an ecumenical council, since it had not been summoned by a legitimate pope, and the subsequently elected pope, Martin V, never gave the needed papal confirmation to Haec sancta. However, others argue that, given the actual circumstances, a general council could act without the approval of a pope, since this was the only way the schism could be brought to an end. The principle here was the sound one, that if the actions of a pope tended to tear down the church rather than to build it up, the church could not lack an adequate remedy, which a general council would have authority to apply. Obviously, in such a case, the council’s authority could not depend on papal convocation or approval, but would have to come, as Haec sancta says, immediately from Christ.

I believe that, given the actual situation, Constance was correct in describing itself as a general council, with authority from Christ to do what had to be done to resolve the schism. For this purpose, it had first to declare its own competence to act as it intended to do. That necessarily involved declaring that everyone, even of papal dignity, was bound to obey it in matters that pertained to the faith and the eradication of the said schism. (It is another question whether the decree went too far in including “matters which pertain to the reform of the church,” and in extending this also to “any other legitimately assembled general council.”) We shall focus our question on the dogmatic weight of Haec sancta: Did the council define its authority over “everyone, even of papal dignity” as a dogma of faith?

On this question I agree with several noted scholars, including such experts on medieval conciliar history as Hubert Jedin and Brian Tierney, who agree that Constance did not intend to issue this decree as a dogma of faith. Tierney puts it this way:

Haec sancta is not cast in the form of a solemn dogmatic definition. It does not demand belief, like a dogmatic definition; it exacts obedience, like a decree of positive law. In its preamble, Haec sancta does not purport to define an article of faith. It does not appeal to scripture or tradition. It does not pronounce anathemas against unbelievers. We cannot be sure that it was intended as an immutable dogmatic decree, and in such cases it would surely be wise to adopt a variation of Ockham’s razor and abide by the principle that “Infallibilities are not to be multiplied without necessity.”

Hubert Jedin agrees with this view, and notes also that when the schismatic Council of Basel attempted to define conciliar supremacy over legitimate pope as an article of faith, it was raising a new issue that had not been raised at Constance.

Tierney and Jedin, along with other scholars, agree in seeing Haec sancta not as a dogmatic definition, but as a legislative decree, applying a generally accepted principle of medieval canon law to the actual situation in which the church found itself, and extending this principle to similar situations if they occur in the future. There is a good deal of ambiguity in the way Constance expressed this decree, and scholars will no doubt continue to differ in their interpretation of it. But there is good authority for holding that while it is a valid decree, it is not a dogmatic definition. One could also raise the question whether, at the time it enacted this decree, Constance possessed the authority to define a dogma of faith. It certainly had the authority to do what had to be done to resolve the schism. But for that, it was not necessary to settle a dogmatic issue. In my opinion, Constance did not have the authority to define a dogma of faith until later on, when its judgement could be confirmed by a certainly legitimate pope.

Prior to electing such a legitimate pope, the council had issued two doctrinal decrees, condemning a number of propositions of John Wycliff and John Hus. Martin V, the pope elected by the council, subsequently issued a bull which contained all those propositions and called upon persons suspected of favoring the opinions of Wycliff or Hus to declare that they rejected them. The papal bull confirmed the conciliar judgement concerning the opinions of Wycliff and Hus that “some of them are notoriously heretical, some erroneous, others rash and seditious, others offensive to pious ears.” Since such a “global censure” does not identify which propositions are condemned as heretical, one cannot identify which propositions the council intended to define as dogmas of faith. Hence, while the conciliar decrees against Wycliff and Hus received explicit papal confirmation, they do not contain any dogmatic definition.

The other important decree of Constance was the one obliging the pope to summon general councils at regular intervals: the decree Frequens. This is clearly a legislative decree, which soon fell into desuetude. But it did result in the summoning of the next great council: begun at Basel, continued at Ferrara and Florence, and concluded in Rome.[1]

[1] Francis Sullivan, Creative Fidelity: Weighing and Interpreting Documents of the Magisterium (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2003), 71-75.