Eclectic Anecdotes

I think that the problems of knowledge and certainty are topics that should be addressed prior to other philosophical problems because this will impact our view of the world which necessarily includes philosophical problems and how they are approached.

To start, let’s consider the possibility of a strong form of knowledge of the sort that can be said to be infallible, alleged truths that cannot be false, that are impossible to deny. The laws of logic are commonly said to be of this sort of knowledge. The law of non-contradiction is one of these laws, which states that there cannot be two contradictory truths that exist in the same way. As an example, it would be contradictory to say that God exists and God doesn’t exist are both true if we understand God in both the affirmative and denial statements to have the same definition. Only one can be true.

However, the law of non-contradiction only holds for a “normal” mental state. There are outlier mental states of which logic doesn’t hold. Cotard’s syndrome is a condition where a person can firmly believe the proposition “I do not exist” applies to them, seeing no problem of the contradiction between the “I” (recognition of existence of self) and “do not exist” (rejection of existence of self).[1] A person who we consider to have a “normal” functioning mind would have more difficulty maintaining true contradictory beliefs, but people with Cotard’s syndrome or other neurological disorders are evidence that the laws of logic do not have the universal status of infallibility as is commonly assumed. It is only what is considered as normative mental states under standard, consistent language that these laws of logic are upheld.

Cotard’s syndrome provides an example of how different mental statuses yield different ways of thinking. This is why it doesn’t make sense to take a strong form of foundationalism that applies to all humans. However, we can still recognize certain principles as rules under typical language games. Given normal language and mental states, the law of non-contradiction holds.

We should be careful not to think of knowledge as if we are omniscient. The analytic tradition makes the mistake of introducing truthmakers into the world, as if there is a real non-naturalistic entity known as a truthmaker working in the world that one can somehow mentally interact with to know that a proposition is true or false. Instead, we can safely say that beliefs are contingent. What we can consider as facts, even if not infallible, can be considered “good enough” given our standards for facts in our language games. For example, some events recorded as history can be considered factual “beyond a reasonable doubt” because given our demands for evidence we find ourselves convinced that what is claimed as historical fact must be true. We can hold this view while still maintaining its contingency, even if what it would take to overthrow its factual status is extreme, such as the discovery of aliens having planted evidence to fabricate history.

A realistic understanding of knowledge can be provided by Friedrich Nietzsche:

Against that positivism which stops before phenomena, saying “there are only facts,” I should say: no, it is precisely facts that do not exist, only interpretations.[2]

This perspectivism does not need to be interpreted in a strong sense that says that people are wrong to consider anything as factual. Rather, Nietzsche is criticizing positivists who say that there are objective facts in the world independent of human interpretation. Everything we come to know is through phenomena; we have no access to anything in a way that bypasses human experience. Phenomena can be interpreted in numerous ways, hence why people can come to different opinions regarding evidence. Sometimes evidence becomes so overwhelming that for the majority of people there is only one way of interpretating it, and for a standard language game of discovery of facts, most people would agree that it is sufficient to label something a fact. Other phenomena, however, cannot attain to such a universal level of agreement. Whether a religious experience should be interpreted as supernatural or merely a natural occurrence, there will be disagreement, and so application of the term “fact” to a particular perspective will depend on the language game, whether it be in a form of life easily willing to accept supernatural events or a form of life that interprets all phenomena as natural.

Knowledge in a softer sense can be what holds true in certain language games. But we must still recognize knowledge is an approximation of truth, for as was mentioned earlier, humans are not omniscient.

The more extreme skeptical scenarios like the simulation hypothesis or brain in a vat scenarios cannot be consistently maintained because they are not part of our ordinary language games. That does not mean they are false, but they do not have significance in our forms of life. Wittgenstein also writes of certainties that are parts of our life that allows reasoned knowledge to built off of, what can be described as hinge certainties. He writes, “I want to say: it’s not that on some points men know the truth with perfect certainty. No: perfect certainty is only a matter of their attitude.”[3] Giving reasons ultimately runs out of grounds. “But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting.”[4] To have beliefs of possessing a body and there being an external world can be considered real knowledge because these are basic or given hinge certainties that inform how we act. Because we don’t hold ourselves to be omniscient, we don’t need infallible “proof” to have knowledge. What can be classified as knowledge at one point can be dismissed later if better evidence supplants it; this is knowledge as an approximation, not infallible truth.

By discussing with others who hold different perspectives how they came to their perspectives, we can have a more compassionate relationship with others rather than rejecting those who hold different beliefs as “stupid” or “ignorant.” We may find they are not as crazy or wrong as they may initially seem, and we may also find areas in their reasoning that are not particularly strong, and they may do the same with our beliefs as well. This process can help everyone get to a closer approximation to truth, even if we can never achieve infallibility in our beliefs.

[1] https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4271387/

[2] Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Portable Nietzsche (Portable Library) (p. 458). Kindle Edition.

[3] Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe, eds. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), §404.

[4] On Certainty, §110.